The U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict: Who Benefits and Who Weakens?
The U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict: Who Benefits and Who Weakens?
A Critical and Evidence-Based Assessment for the 2024–2026 Period
Dr. Murat ONARAN
March 21, 2026
Abstract
This article examines the question of “who benefits” from the military and geopolitical conflict shaped along the axis of the United States, Israel, and Iran during the 2024–2026 period, without reducing it to a one-dimensional conspiracy narrative. The central argument is that this conflict does not produce a clear and absolute gain for any actor; rather, while providing some actors with short-term relative advantages, it increases costs for almost all in the long term.
The study evaluates the conflict across five dimensions: domestic politics, military-strategic balance, energy and trade corridors, sanctions and diplomatic mechanisms, and international law. The findings indicate that a security-centered political agenda has been consolidated in Israel, while in the United States the discourse of regional deterrence and alliance management has gained strength—albeit at the cost of high financial, legal, and diplomatic burdens.
For Iran, the conflict has enabled a limited short-term consolidation around the regime and the remobilization of the “resistance” narrative; however, in the medium term it has led to harsher sanctions, deepening economic vulnerability, and increased international pressure on the nuclear file.
Additionally, crises along the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz have imposed significant costs on global shipping, energy prices, and supply chains. Ultimately, the article argues that the primary beneficiaries are not states but rather security bureaucracies, sanction architectures, crisis economies, and structures sustained by defense spending; the greatest losers are regional populations, civilians, and global economic stability.
Keywords
United States, Israel, Iran, geopolitical conflict, sanctions, Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, energy security, international law
The U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict: Who Benefits and Who Weakens?
The escalating conflict among the United States, Israel, and Iran in recent years is not merely a power struggle between three states. It lies at the intersection of interconnected issues such as the Gaza war, attacks on maritime trade in the Red Sea, Iran’s nuclear program, regional proxy networks, and great power competition.
For this reason, an academic answer to the question “Who benefits from this war?” cannot provide a definitive list of winners explained by a hidden plan of a single actor. A more realistic approach is to examine which actors gain relative advantages, over what time horizons, at what costs, and through which institutional mechanisms.
The central claim of this article is as follows:
Although the conflict has created maneuvering space for certain political and institutional actors in the short term, it has rendered the regional security architecture more fragile in the medium and long term, while increasing economic, humanitarian, and legal costs. Therefore, the concept of “benefit” here does not imply normative approval, but rather refers to relative interest, capacity expansion, or agenda control.
Indeed, the disruption of global trade due to the Red Sea crisis, the sharp decline in traffic through the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb, and the risk premium generated around the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate that the conflict produces an economy of instability rather than prosperity for most actors (World Bank, 2025a; U.S. Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2025).
Methodology and Analytical Framework
This study is a compilation and synthesis based on official institutional documents, reports from international organizations, and reputable policy analyses. The source base includes materials from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), World Bank, IMF, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations, and the UK House of Commons Library.
Thus, instead of unverified claims circulating on social media or singular propagandistic narratives, traceable and verifiable data points are utilized.
The analytical framework rests on five axes:
Domestic political benefits and legitimacy production
Military-strategic outcomes and deterrence balances
Energy, maritime transport, and global pricing mechanisms
Sanctions, diplomacy, and international law
Humanitarian costs
This structure allows the so-called “behind-the-scenes” dimension to be explained not through ethnicity or religious identity, but through institutional interests, security doctrines, political incentives, and economic structures.
Short Timeline of the Conflict and Structural Background
Following 2023, regional tensions accelerated with the Gaza war and gained a maritime security dimension with the involvement of Iran-backed armed networks, particularly the Houthis. According to World Bank data, by the end of 2024 the Red Sea crisis had reduced traffic through the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb by approximately three-quarters, creating a severe contraction in a route that previously carried about 30% of global container traffic (World Bank, 2025a).
The same report indicates that between October 2023 and December 2024, Houthi forces carried out hundreds of attacks on commercial vessels, significantly increasing global freight costs.
In 2025, tensions evolved into a more explicit interstate dimension. According to the UK House of Commons Library, between June 13–23, 2025, Israel conducted strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear program, missile infrastructure, and energy facilities; on June 22, 2025, the United States directly joined military operations. Iran responded with missile and UAV attacks. Although a ceasefire was declared on June 24, 2025, the extent of the damage and its impact on Iran’s nuclear program remained contested (House of Commons Library, 2025).
This suggests a shift from crisis management to a controlled but reproducible conflict cycle.
The nuclear file also hardened during this period. According to CRS, with the activation of the E3 “snapback” mechanism, UN sanctions were reimposed on September 27, 2025, placing Iran once again under a stricter international pressure framework (CRS, 2025a). Thus, military escalation and sanction architecture became mutually reinforcing parallel channels.
Who Benefits Most from This Conflict?
The most careful answer is that those who benefit the most are often not individual nations but institutional structures that derive power from crises.
First, security bureaucracies and defense spending expand. For Israel, the sustained visibility of the Iranian threat strengthens the weight of security-centered state capacity and intelligence/military institutions. For the United States, framing Iran and its networks as regional threats generates additional legitimacy for military presence, missile defense, naval patrols, and alliance coordination (CRS, 2025b; CFR, 2025).
Second, some political authorities gain short-term agenda-setting advantages. Governments facing domestic economic challenges or political polarization can centralize power by emphasizing external threats.
Third, sanction regimes and crisis economies create opportunities for certain actors. Increased pressure on Iran generates risk premiums in global energy and shipping markets. However, given the critical importance of Hormuz, short-term gains rarely offset long-term security risks (EIA, 2025; IEA, 2026).
Fourth, third-party actors such as Russia and China may gain limited geopolitical maneuverability, but these gains remain conditional and fragile.
Israel: Relative Gains and Heavy Costs
Israel’s main short-term benefit lies in legitimizing military pressure against Iran’s threat capacity and networks. However, these gains are tactical rather than strategic.
Uncertainty regarding the actual damage to Iran’s nuclear program demonstrates the limits of military solutions (House of Commons Library, 2025).
Moreover, these gains come with significant diplomatic and legal costs. The Gaza war and regional escalation have intensified international legal debates and increased legitimacy pressures (International Court of Justice [ICJ], 2024; UN News, 2025).
The United States: Regional Order or Costly Commitment?
For the United States, the relative benefit lies in reinforcing deterrence and alliance networks. However, this comes with substantial costs:
Renewed risks of direct military entanglement
Criticism regarding international law and human rights consistency
Economic pressures via global inflation and logistics disruptions (IMF, 2024; World Bank, 2025a)
Thus, U.S. gains are neither absolute nor cost-free.
Iran: Short-Term Consolidation, Medium-Term Erosion
Iran benefits in the short term through regime consolidation under external threat. However, economic and diplomatic indicators show long-term erosion:
Deepening sanctions
Currency depreciation and inflation pressures
Increased international isolation (World Bank, 2025b; CRS, 2025a)
Additionally, military pressure may push Iran toward a more opaque and less controllable nuclear strategy.
Energy, Maritime Trade, and Crisis Economy
The Red Sea crisis has significantly increased shipping costs and disrupted global logistics (World Bank, 2025a).
While some actors benefit from rising prices, the overall system experiences increased uncertainty and cost.
International Law and Diplomacy
The conflict is also a struggle of legal narratives. No actor has achieved a clear diplomatic victory; instead, positions have hardened (UN Press, 2025; ICJ, 2024).
The Greatest Losers
The primary losers are civilians, regional economies, and global stability.
Humanitarian destruction, displacement, and economic contraction highlight the real costs of the conflict (ICJ, 2024; OCHA, 2025; IMF, 2024).
Discussion
The conflict produces “negative benefits”: gains derived from threat narratives rather than prosperity.
The real and lasting beneficiaries are institutional structures managing the conflict, while societies bear the costs.
Conclusion
The U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict does not produce a clear and absolute winner. Instead, it generates a multi-layered structure of relative gains and significant costs.
The greatest beneficiaries are institutional structures sustaining the war economy, while the greatest losers are civilians, fragile economies, and international legal norms.
Dr. Murat ONARAN
March 21, 2026
References
Congressional Research Service. (2025a). Iran’s nuclear program and the reimposition of UN sanctions.
Congressional Research Service. (2025b). U.S. foreign aid to Israel.
Council on Foreign Relations. (2025). Red Sea crisis.
House of Commons Library. (2025). Iran: June 2025 strikes.
International Atomic Energy Agency. (2025). Statement on Iran.
International Court of Justice. (2024). South Africa v. Israel.
International Energy Agency. (2026). Strait of Hormuz.
International Monetary Fund. (2024). Regional Economic Outlook.
OCHA. (2025). Gaza updates.
UN News. (2025). Security Council meeting.
UN Press. (2025). Council statements.
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2025). Hormuz analysis.
World Bank. (2025a). Red Sea crisis.
World Bank. (2025b). Iran macro outlook.